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Media issues in Australian-Asian Relations, 1998.
Rodney Tiffen

I confess at once that politics defies prediction: Who in December 1975, when
Indonesia annexed East Timor, would have predicted that sixteen years later
they would have failed so utterly to win Timorese hearts and minds that the
youth of Dili, most of whom were still infants at the time of the invasion, would
risk death and imprisonment to demonstrate their desire for Timorese
independence?
The difficulty of seeing ahead five years has been graphically illustrated by
the unpredicted and unpredictable events of the last five years. Who, even at
the beginning of the years in which they happened, would have predicted the
Gulf War? or the fall of the Berlin Wall? Who, before the crucial events were
under way, predicted the collapse of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe,
and the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself into fifteen countries.
Errors in prediction are not made only in the direction of underestimating
change, but of underestimating constancy: We are now approaching the
twentieth anniversary of the first forecasts that President Suharto would step
down. After the Malari riots of 1974 and the crisis in the national oil company
Pertamina in 1975-6, many were forecasting that the President's retirement
was imminent. Similarly in every Presidential term since, there have been
false predictions that it will be President Suharto's last.
So if the incidence of errors is sure to be high, why engage in such
speculations?

The short answer is because it focusses our mind on the

dynamics of change, and on distinguishing the fundamentals from the
ephemera in recent controversies, to try to look beyond the particularities of
say media reporting of the case involving the Gillespie children or the
controversy over Embassy to the types of incidents they are, and how the
forces that gave rise to them may manifest themselves in some other way in
the future.
Five years is also a problematic period to choose for our crystal ball gazing.
The late Professor Dick Spann once told me that the then fashion for Third
World governments to issue five year plans was particularly dangerous. It
was far enough ahead for optimism and wishful thinking to overwhelm their
current perceptions of obstacles and frustrations, yet near enough for their
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failure to achieve the targets to soon become apparent to all. Similarly Max
Walsh has written that one of the prudential rules of journalism is the nearer
the event, the more you should fudge your forecast, because you run the risk
of very visibly being wrong.
However, a distance of five years from now should provide some discipline on
our speculations.
The further futurologists project forward, the more
undifferentiated towards either optimism or pessimism their forecasts
become. They become either utopian, usually on the basis of the wonders of
coming technologies, or dystopian, usually foreseeing either the triumph of
some dictatorial big brother, or, its antithesis, the triumph of ungovernability
and chaos. My view is that history will continue to be messy, to be morally
ambiguous and double-edged and the coming years will bring both changes
that most of us would welcome and others we would abhor. So, five years is
far enough, but not too far ahead, to focus our mind.
I want to structure my speculations around four main propositions:
The first is that national boundaries are becoming increasingly permeable to
all types of movements and interchanges. The secular trend is clear: History
and technology are on the side of more open borders and against those
governments who seek to build high walls closing off what they call their own
internal affairs.
As all aspects of international life and exchange - trade, travel, education,
culture, crime - continue to become more intense, government to government
relations are a proportionately smaller part of the sum of international
transactions. Governments are therefore increasingly reacting diplomatically
to events they do not control, and often cannot anticipate. Moreover, as all
types of interchanges continue to grow, the capacity of national governments
to patrol their own borders - to exclude unwanted external influences and to
contain internal secrets from the rest of the world - will continue to diminish.
The transnational dimensions of what we still call international relations and of
transnational influences upon national politics continue to grow. The biggest,
most obvious and most commented upon are transnational corporations.
Much less commented upon is the growth of transnational non-governmental
organisations. The most important NGOs - like Amnesty, Greenpeace, major
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aid organisations - have much larger international networks than they had a
decade ago. They are another ingredient making it more difficult for
governments to maintain information monopolies.
Many contemporary political agendas require transnational approaches. All
the most prosperous economies are more interlinked than a generation ago,
and the prosperity of one is affected by the prosperity of others. Equally, the
emergence of environmental concerns is perhaps the ultimate in transnational
issues.
Somewhat related is the tendency of dissatisfied groups in any country to
appeal to an international audience to buttress their cause. Indeed the United
Nations, now its every stance is no longer a pawn in Cold War politics, is
likely to be more activist and important on many issues.

Particularly

interesting here has been the international forums on indigenous peoples, the
domestic political balance on this, the most apparently internal of issues,
being transformed by international visibility. A parallel but contrasting
example concerns the importance of immigration in the contemporary world.
Stephen Castles has estimated that there are 100 million people in the world
living in a country other than that they were born in. Immigrants' problems
and diaspora communities increasingly complicate state to state relations.
Emigre networks also make it harder for states to contain information within
their own borders. The continuing flow of information from East Timor, wr.c-n
all the conditions for sealing it from international view are otherwise so
propitious, is a telling example.
The final transnational influence is the oldest, one of the institutions which
pre-dated the nation state - religion. We have sometimes seen the capacity
of Christian, especially perhaps Roman Catholic, networks to limit and
oppose state despotism in particular countries. The biggest change, today,
of course is the growing influence of Islam, whose transnational influence has
been greatly boosted in recent decades both by the support of petro-dollars,
and following the fall of the Shah, the ideological power that comes after a
successful revolution.
This quick listing is sufficient to show that the growth of transnational traffic in
goods and services, in people, in ideas, information and political symbols is
increasingly important politically. But we should conclude it with a specifically
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The growth of fax machines, telephones, e-mail and

international travel have all weakened the capacity of nation states to act as
gate-keepers, deciding what information their citizens can import and export.
The most powerful mass medium, television, is now also beginning to emerge
as an international force. It is hard to grasp the astounding growth of access
to TV in Asia: in 1965 Asia had 12% of the world's TV sets; in 1990, it had
32%.1 Admittedly, TV in all these countries except Japan, is very much at
state direction. But it is a force, which typically produces unintended impacts,
which its controllers cannot foresee nor control. Added to this, of course, is
the growth of satellite TV, still in its infancy, but likely to challenge patterns of
political control in the coming decade or two.
Domestic political activity is increasingly influenced by news from elsewhere.
The greatest domino effect in world history occurred in Eastern Europe, not
through the march of arms, but by the spread of information. The news of
what was happening in neighbouring countries inspired and emboldened
dissidents in their own countries. Political ideas and ideals now move across
issue communities and through mass media much more quickly.
The trend towards increasing transnationalisation does not lead to any
necessary diminution of conflict, nor of any automatic democratisation in
currently authoritarian countries.

Rather there are increasing tensions and

contradictory trends.
Consider the case of the most economically dynamic but still politically
authoritarian regimes in East and Southeast Asia. On the one hand, their
economies are at least semi-open, dependent centrally upon their links to
international economies for their growth. Moreover their societies are semiopen - with much greater international movement of people and information.
In Malaysia, for example, there are 100,000 graduates of the Australian
education system.2 However, in the cases of Malaysia, Singapore and
Indonesia, it could also be argued that the regimes have become more
efficiently authoritarian - eliminating rival centres of authority, and centralising
and routinising patterns of patronage. However the regimes' desire for control
is in an at least some tension with the other forces towards openness, and we
are likely to see contradictory movements in all these countries towards and
away from greater media freedoms, especially while the current generation of
rulers are still in power.
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The desire to maintain state control against the onslaught of international
information is illustrated in a story from Singapore, which sounds like an
urban myth, but which I am assured is true: an amah put out a wok to dry on
the roof, and within an hour the authorities had visited the house to check
whether it was an illegally established satellite dish.
Another apparent contradiction in the trend toward transnationalisation is that
it does not mean any reduction in the force of nationalism as a political
sentiment and ideology. Just as the bewildering pace of change in the
secular world often encourages a psychological yearning for a return to the
certainties of fundamentalist religion, so in an increasingly complicated and
uncertain transnational world, recourse to nationalism is one of the most
popular proposed remedies when things go wrong, and national resentments
will always have a strong popular constituency.
This is true not only of the post-colonial sensitivities of many Asian countries,
but also of Australia.
Which brings me to my second proposition: Australian media coverage of
Asia, overall, will not improve.
There may be significant ups and downs in particular organisations or in
coverage about particular countries - for example in the last few years, The
Australian has given much improved coverage of our region.

Similarly it is

likely in the next couple of years there will be improved coverage from
Indonesia. Five years ago, in the aftermath of many incidents beginning with
East Timer-related coverage and climaxing with the David Jenkins articles on
the Suharto billions, there were no Australian staff correspondents based in
Jakarta. It is likely that by this time next year there will be four, and so a more
regular and reliable diet of Indonesian news. However, the general outlook is
bleak.
Up until the end of 1986, one could argue that Australian media coverage had
been a lag indicator in Australian-Asian relations, usually running behind
contemporary outlooks and opportunities in political debate and policy
movement, but nevertheless moving in the same broad direction; that as
Australia's overall enmeshment with Asia increased, so the quantity and
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quality of media engagement with Asia was improving, albeit belatedly and
partially.
Now that proposition is too optimistic. The primary reason for greater
pessimism is the trend in the political economy of Australian media since the
great ownership convulsions which began in 1986-87.
The economies of East and Southeast Asia have been much more dynamic
than have the Australian media industries, which have been going through a
period of contraction and economising which is likely to continue.
Triggered by changes in Government policy, we have had the greatest shakeout of media ownership in the nation's history. In a frenzy of activity at the
height of the share boom, all Australia's TV networks changed hands, as did
three quarters of the metropolitan daily newspapers.

In the long hangover

since, seven daily newspapers have closed, as have a few weekly titles. All
the TV networks have changed owners again, and the industry recorded,
thanks entirely to its owners' debt binges, its first losses since the very first
years of Australian TV.
The result is that all Australia's commercial media are much meaner
organisations than they were. Most obviously, there has been a general
cutting back on the resources devoted to news gathering. Some of these
have been quite drastic, and it could be argued that the TEN network, in
particular, now falls short of providing the independent and comprehensive
news services, its licence conditions state it should.3
More embracingly, there has been, in my view, a distinct change of attitude,
where the "bottom line" rules above all else. At the risk of over-generalising, I
would argue that there is much more of a sense of what can we get away
with? What is the minimum expenditure on news gathering consonant with
maintaining our revenue? And it is unlikely that maintaining or expanding the
resources for covering Asian news would count as a means of increasing
audience.
Those in organisations arguing on the basis primarily of
professional obligation, of the responsibilities of journalism, seem increasingly
embattled.
Two other trends derive at least partially from the parlous economics of the
media industry.
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Even the best media organisations are

financially very strained, but there remains in them much more of a sense of
relating to Australia's major issues. In contrast, the tabloid press and the
commercial TV stations have moved even more in the direction of easy
audience gratification.
A related trend is that in those media organisations the centre of gravity is
now even more firmly parochial. Their sense of newsworthiness is even more
constricted to themes familiar to the lowest common denominator of their
audiences. Witness, for example, the trend in commercial TV in what are
loosely called their 'current affairs' programs. Each of the networks has one.
In each case it is a nationally produced program, with state current affairs
programs having been one of the casualties of the ownership changes. But
each has moved away from covering that day's news, from covering almost
any political topics to more and more human interest type topics. In the diet
of schmaltz, false sensation and trivia they now present is it possible to
imagine a serious story on Australia's Asian future?
Thus lack of commitment of resources, and very constricted notions of
newsworthiness, will continue to plague our coverage of Asia, and the
grounds for pessimism are growing rather than contracting for large sections
of the Australian media.
The preceding is a discussion of regular rather than extraordinary coverage.
However we should now address one of the biggest changes in media
capabilities over the last generation - their capacity to respond immediately
and intensively to something they define as a major crisis. The meaning of
saturation coverage of an international story is now qualitatively different from
say two decades ago.
Vietnam was called the first television war. But coverage of the Gulf war was
far more overwhelming - in its speed, in the range of international locales it
used, in the sheer volume of coverage, it dwarfed anything from the Vietnam
era. It was only in 1975 that daily satellite news feed, of ten minutes a day
shared by all four channels, began. Since then the volume and variety of
sources have grown enormously, such that in the mid 1980s there was an
explosion of international coverage on TV. Although in terms of regular
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output that has now diminished somewhat again, on a major story like the
Gulf War, it is feasible to talk of continuous coverage for some days.
It should be noted in passing here that the commercial channels in Australia
have increased their international coverage essentially by plugging into British
and American sources. In routine coverage that has not helped us view the
world according to our own regional priorities. Both British and American TV
is relatively weak in its coverage of Southeast Asia, and to a lesser extent of
East Asia.
Nevertheless, the capacity for saturation coverage, and immediate, graphic
TV coverage of major stories leads to my third proposition:
On major stories, the media will more commonly be implicated in the
development of the events they are reporting upon.
To see how the media coverage feeds back into events, let us consider in
turn the three major recent TV stories from the region. The first was the fall of
Marcos in 1986. Various estimates put the number of international media
people in Manila at the time as well over 1ooo.4 The very intensity of their
presence must have helped the morale of the demonstrators. The impact of
the coverage was strongly against the regime, with themes of corruption,
dictatorship, and brutality against democracy, courage and reform. Even the
visual images of the two leading protagonists, Marcos and Cory Aqu:~o.
seemed to visually epitomise a struggle between corruption and purity.
In my view the international media limited what the Marcos regime could do to
stay in power. Put simply, if there had not been such a massive Western
media presence, it is likely the episode would have developed into a much
bloodier confrontation. The Marcos regime was very tied to American
support, which it could not afford to alienate by such a public military
suppression.
The American government's responses were, it can be
plausibly argued, constrained by the American TV coverage.
Consider the international media dimensions of the second major episode,
the Tiananmien Square demonstrations and massacres of May-June 1989.
Firstly the demonstrators' timing was affected by the arrival of Soviet Premier
Gorbachev, whose credentials as a reforming and democratising communist
leader, were well known to them, much better known than developments in
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Eastern Europe would have been known to Chinese students a decade
earlier. Secondly, they were clearly emboldened, tragically so it turned out,
by the intense international media interest in what they were doing. Finally
reflect on the many dimensions of the symbolism of Chinese dissidents not
reaching into their own past, but instead erecting a papier mache Statue of
Liberty which they parade before the international media. It shows they were
invigorated by the international spread of ideas, but also I think that partially
at least they were deliberately playing to an international audience to seek to
bolster their domestic pressures. They were as keen to communicate the
truth of what was happening to an international as to a domestic audience.
There was a great upsurge in the use of faxes and e-mail by dissidents to
contact academics, media and NGOs in the West, all effectively evading state
attempts at censorship.
In this case, of course, the response of the Chinese gerontocracy paid no
attention to Western audience sensibilities, but cracked down brutally on the
demonstrators. One wonders however if the next generation of Chinese
leaders will feel able to do likewise.
The third case involved the city with the most sophisticated communications
infra-structure, the Bangkok riots and subsequent change of government in
May 1992. Consider how new communication technologies interacted with
the development of events.
Firstly, the demonstrators were able to
communicate with each other quickly by use of their mobile phones. They
were dubbed the "mobile-phone mob", and this instrument increased the
effectiveness of their demonstrations. For the first time satellite transmission
of Western TV news coverage, over and above state-controlled domestic TV
transmission, became a factor. Demonstrators who had access to satellite
dishes made videotapes of coverage, which they immediately copied and
distributed all over the city to counteract the information monopoly the regime
exercised over domestic television. This no doubt contributed to the decisive
intervention by the King, and the ousting of General Suchinda as Prime
Minister.
What do the three cases have in common?
1. Key events took place in the capital city, and Western correspondents
routinely had access to that city.
2. Key participants spoke English.
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3. TV coverage was logistically feasible, and visually compelling.
4. There was a moral polarisation around themes immediately salient to
Western audiences.
Contrast these factors with a case which has not received such prominent
coverage, and where international coverage has had no impact on the regime
- namely Burma. There is a lack of routine media access to the country, an
inability to cover, or televise, key events, which are dispersed and/or
happening in rural areas. Few participants speak English. And the regime is
oblivious to international opinion, and relatively immune from international
sanctions. The only factor they had in common was moral polarisation, with a
strong positive image in the Western media of Aung Sang Suu Chee.
Although not a major problem in the episodes discussed, one of the dangers
of intense coverage, is of course that it is filtered into story lines immediately
salient to its audience, and that there are pressures towards a distorting moral
simplicity. At any one time, the momentum of news coverage is usally very
much in one direction: when was the last time you saw a story about the limits
of corruption in Japan?
In the examples discussed, I suppose international media coverage has
emerged as on balance a good thing, something more often than not
pressuring the participants towards a more reasonable outcome. Western
governments have been induced to respond, when their inclinations might
have been otherwise. There is no guarantee of course that that response will
always be beneficial.
Sometimes it will be but a cynical juggling of
appearances. Witness the recent case of the Bosnian girl victim of war
shown on British TV which prompted the British Government to undertake
action to help her, but without any apparent awareness that there were
thousands more like her who had not appeared on TV. (While speaking of
events in the former Yugoslavia, it is pertinent to ask how the realisation of
the media's impact is affecting behaviour towards it. We should remember
that more than 35 journalists have already been killed in the wars in the
former Yugoslavia, more than were killed in the whole of the Vietnam war,
and for the first time there is evidence that journalists have been targetted
precisely because they are journalists.)
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So far, there has not been any incident involving such intense international
TV coverage in the three remaining original members of ASEAN - Malaysia,
Singapore and Indonesia - whose governments are the ones which have
been most critical of Australian media. Particularly in Indonesia's case the
relative absence of American coverage seems particularly curious - given that
it is the fifth most populous country, and occupies a very strategic area. One
might predict however that if those governments are ever confronted with a
massive influx of American TV journalists, they are likely to become quickly
nostalgic for the culturally sensitive Australian journalists they used to have to
deal with.
My final proposition derives from the media's active influence in the
development of events they are reporting. It is that media associated conflicts
are likely to keep on occurring.
Many of these conflicts will not be caused by the Australian media in any
simple or direct sense. Often they will be but a secondary exacerbating factor
in conflicts whose roots lie elsewhere.
The controversies between Australia and Malaysia over the last several years
illustrate the various means by which the media may become implicated. The
execution of Barlow and Chambers for drug offences in 1986 provoked many
stories reporting statements by Australian politicians and others protesting
against the punishments. There were also many television stories which
concentrated upon the human aspects surrounding the capital punishment of
these two individuals. In the process the strongest story line was often to
portray the Malaysian governmental and legal processes as unfair or
barbaric, displaying the tendency, especially among commercial media,
towards moral polarisation. It is likely there will be future incidents involving
drug crimes and their punishment, and equally likely they will lead to intense
emotions on all sides.
A few years later, the fictional TV drama series Embassy provoked official
outrage in Malaysia. Whether any or all of the complaints were justified,
certainly no-one anticipated that the program would create such a response
from the Malaysian Prime Minister. However as Australian popular culture
increasingly embraces Asian themes, it is more than likely other such offence
may be given.
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Similarly, it is not likely that we will have an exact repetition of the Gillespie
children controversy, which is ongoing, and concerns the abduction by a
Malaysian prince of the children from his broken marriage with an Australian
woman. However, one could expect as the number of mixed marriages
increase, somewhat similar incidents could explode, with media coverage
again seen as an exacerbating element.
Reciting these incidents shows that it is sometimes, but not always, possible
to predict what will cause offence. However, predicting what will give offence
is not the same as predicting what the response will be. There is very
considerable latitude for regional governments to decide whether or not to
escalate media irritants. Even if a Malaysian Prime Minister is mortified by
something on Australian TV, it does not automatically follow that he will build
it into a major diplomatic controversy.

Even if it is predictable that the

Indonesian Government will not like an article by David Jenkins about the
Suharto billions, it certainly does not logically follow that the upshot will
include returning a plane load of Australian tourists to Bali. Whether or not
regional governments want to engage in such escalations will have more to
do with their international and domestic political agendas than with the
Australian media as such.
The second conclusion which is apparent is that the occurrence of media
associated conflicts follows from the increased intensity of interactions, which
create more scope for frictions to develop. One prediction I will make is that
some time in the next five years there will be a major controversy over the
content of satellite TV coming into the region, although its exact shape and
timing remain unpredictable.
A third conclusion is that the occurrence of such conflicts has zero relation to
the quality of Australian coverage. In some cases, the media betrayed
prejudice and sensationalism. In others they performed their role admirably,
and conflict still ensued.
Finally, I would like to muse on some of the policy implications of this state of
affairs for the Australian government. It is clear that these types of incidents
are going to keep on happening, that they cannot be easily anticipated, and
that there are no simple measures by which they can be contained, or
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The discomfort of Australian policy-

makers is not likely to disappear.
I make but two suggestions: The first is the need for an enlarged calculus of
pragmatism based upon a stronger sense of what the government can't
control. I have long argued for example that a consistently principled
approach to the issue of East Timor would have been more pragmatic than
the waverings and contradictions which did in fact occur.
Secondly, the worst response for the government, if seriously intended, is the
'Harare posture'. After the Embassy imbroglio, the film Turtle Beach based
upon a novel by the Prime Minister's biographer came out, and also offended
the Malaysians.

Prime Minister Hawke, at a Commonwealth meeting in
Harare, assured Prime Minister Mahatir that he would personally vet

Australian productions, and denounce those which he judged unfair to
Malaysia. This is a rational response, only if it were meant as a conciliatory
but substantially empty gesture. No Australian government can really pretend
that it is able to turn on or turn off the outpourings of Australian media, either
cultural or journalistic. And to set itself up as referee over their contents,
when it lacks impartiality or any means of enforcing its judgements, is surely
only to ask to be attacked by both sides.
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